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In Australia, in the last decade, there have been significant policy changes to income 
support payments for people with a disability and Indigenous people. These policy 
reforms intersect in the experience of Indigenous people with a partial capacity to 
work in the Northern Territory who are subject to compulsory income management if 
classified as long-term welfare payment recipients. This intersection is overlooked in 
existing research and government policy. In this article, we apply intersectionality and 
Southern disability theory as frameworks to analyse how Indigenous people with a 
partial capacity to work (PCW) in the Northern Territory are governed under 
compulsory income management. Whilst the program is theoretically race and ability 
neutral, in practice it targets specific categories of people because it fails to address 
the structural and cultural barriers experienced by Indigenous people with a disability 
and reinscribes disabling and colonising technologies of population control. 
  






In the last decade and a half, there has been an emphasis by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2003; 2007) and other contexts such as the United 
Kingdom (UK) and Canada, and various Australian Federal governments, to move people 
with a disability who have a capacity for employment from disability specific payments in the 
income support system to formal paid work. This marks a global trend in the Anglo-sphere to 
restructure the welfare state (Chouinard, 2010; Hyde, 2000; Roulstone, 2000). Successive 
Australian Federal governments from both sides of politics, have made numerous legislative 
changes to the Disability Support Pension (DSP) (the disability specific income support 
payment in Australia) to encourage people with a disability with a partial capacity to work 
(PCW) into employment to their capacity. 
  
Alongside this, several Australian Federal governments have introduced stringent controls on 
those who receive particular payments in specific regions, subscribing their income support 




payment to compulsory income management (CIM) (also known as ‘welfare quarantining’). 
CIM means that a proportion of a recipient’s income support payment is quarantined by the 
government to ensure that it is spent on priority goods and services such as food and 
healthcare and not on excluded ones such as alcohol, gambling and tobacco. Government 
policy which encourages behavioural changes by Indigenous people is a common approach to 
regulating and attempting to assimilate Indigenous people. Shared Responsibility Agreements 
(SRAs) which began in 2004 were established as local area agreements between the 
government and communities. Through establishing a SRA with the government, Indigenous 
communities would agree to uphold various obligations in return for government resources 
(Lawrence and Gibson, 2007). Nonetheless, the shift to CIM is described as ‘an 
unprecedented restriction of individual freedom […] to promote behavioural change’ 
(Mendes, 2013:503). 
  
Existing research on CIM has largely produced single-axis accounts exposing the racially 
targeted nature of this program, which disproportionately affect Indigenous Australians 
despite supposedly being made racially neutral (see Bielefeld, 2012,2014/2015; Bray et al., 
2014; Humpage, 2016). Marston et al. (2016) examine the tensions between CIM and 
Australia’s National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), which is a person-centred system 
of support designed to enable choice and control, including the self-management of funds. 
Nevertheless, these policy reforms are examined in parallel. There are no studies that explore 
the intersection of disability and indigeneity in the wake of policy changes to the DSP and the 
emergence of CIM. We address this gap by applying intersectionality and Southern disability 
theory (SDT) in a policy analysis which traces how Indigenous people with a PCW in the 
Northern Territory (NT) are governed under CIM. Although CIM is purportedly race and 
ability neutral, the program targets Indigenous people with a PCW insofar as it fails to 
address the structural and cultural barriers experienced by Indigenous people with a disability 
and reproduces disabling and colonising technologies of population control. The article 
begins with a thumbnail sketch of intersectionality theory and methodological debates about 
how to apply it to policy analysis. It then provides a brief explanation of SDT before applying 





Emerging from African American standpoint theory, intersectionality is an important 
framework for conceptualising the interrelationship between multiple categories of identity 
and systems of oppression (Collins, 2000; Crenshaw, 1989; Hankivsky, 2012; Hankivsky and 
Cormier, 2011; May, 2014; Nash, 2008). Although Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term, the 
concept is traced back to the 19
th
 Century work of black feminist intellectuals and activists 
such as Maria Stewart, Anna Julia Cooper and Sojourner Truth (Crenshaw, 1989; May, 2014; 
Strid et al., 2013). It is also more broadly applied in Southern Indigenous standpoint theory 




(Moreton-Robinson, 2000, 2004, 2013) and disability theory, which examines how the 
intersecting structures of colonialism and ableism shape the lived experience of Indigenous 
people with a disability (Connell, 2011; Gilroy et al., 2013; Hollinsworth, 2013; Meekosha, 
2011; Soldatic, 2015). 
  
Crenshaw’s (1989) initial contribution to intersectionality examined the experience of African 
American women seeking redress for discrimination under American discrimination law. The 
structure of discrimination law siloed their experience without acknowledging their 
intersecting experiences of gender and race based discrimination, leaving them with no scope 
for redress. Crenshaw (1989) suggested that the law as well as feminism and antiracist 
politics, placed an emphasis on a single-axis category framework, thereby distorting and 
obscuring the experience of Black women. Intersectionality, then, provided a framework to 
recognise this experience. Discrimination law as a tool for redress, reflects an 
acknowledgement that people who ‘differ’ from the ‘norm’ are treated differently based on 
their gender, race, sexuality or ability. Though criticised for ‘othering’ groups already 
stigmatised, and in practice for failing to recognise an intersectional experience, such 
mechanisms developed in response to neutral policies which, through assuming ‘sameness’ 
(or that ‘likes should be treated alike’), ignored how power and privilege operate to define 
who is ‘alike’ and what this means for those who are disadvantaged. What has been termed 
the ‘sameness/ difference dilemma’ (Williams, 1991), has also been discussed and 
problematised by disability studies scholars and critical race and whiteness studies scholars in 
an Australian context with regard to formal and substantive equality treatment in 
discrimination law (Nielsen, 2008; St Guillaume, 2011). This is because sameness (formal 
equality) obscures the everyday reality of disadvantage, oppression and privilege through 
assuming a state of equality, therefore reinscribing privilege. Difference (substantive 
equality) reifies the ‘differences’ of the ‘other’ without unpacking the privilege ascribed to the 
‘norm’. Intersectionality thus examines questions of difference and sameness around identity 
categories but also is ‘part of a larger critique of rights and legal institutions… [seeking to 
address] the larger ideological structures [such as, policy] in which subjects, problems, and 
solutions were framed’ (Cho et al., 2013:791). 
  
While intersectionality scholars have transformed the terms of debate about sameness and 
difference, there are ongoing challenges associated with translating this approach into a 
coherent methodology for policy analysis. The first is the sheer complexity of synthesising a 
framework to analyse how multiple and intersecting social relations of oppression and 
privilege shaped lived experience (Hankivsky, 2012; Hankivsky and Cormier, 2011). Second, 
there is uncertainty about what kind of change intersectionality demands from established 
approaches to policy analysis and, relatedly, how to determine which categories to examine in 
a specific policy context. Much intersectionality research is concentrated on the categories of 
race, class and gender while other axes of experience are marginalised (Hankivsky, 2012; 
Hankivsky and Cormier, 2011). 





This paper contributes to a growing research agenda concerned with demonstrating the value 
of intersectionality as a methodology for policy making and analysis (Hancock, 2007; 
Hankivsky, 2012; Hankivsky and Cormier, 2011; Lombardo and Rolandsen Agustín, 2012; 
Lombardo and Rolandsen Agustín, 2016; Manuel, 2007; Parken, 2010; Schiek and Lawson, 
2011; Squires, 2009; Strid et al., 2013). It applies Spade’s (2013) conception of population 
control to examine how colonisation produces harms across intersecting policy fields that 
target Indigenous people with a PCW as a population. While empirical applications of 
intersectionality in policy have tended to focus on race, class and gender, there are a number 
of studies within a Southern context examining how the lived experience of marginalised 
people with a disability and/or Indigenous peoples is not sufficiently taken into account in 
single-axis policy making (Kayess et al., 2014; Soldatic et al., 2014; Thill, 2015). Building on 
this research, we also apply SDT to analyse how the lived experience of Indigenous people 
with a disability remains invisible not just within single-axis policy making, but across 




Southern disability theory 
 
SDT examines how the intersecting social categories of race and disability have been 
employed in policy to govern populations in specific ways. It emerged from concerns about 
the dominant role that Global North framings play in disability theorising, silencing Southern 
theoretical perspectives and the experience of disability in the global South (Connell, 2011; 
Meekosha, 2011). Southern disability theorists suggest that disability studies needs to be 
decolonised to allow for alternative conceptualisations of bodies, minds and spaces (Connell, 
2011; Goodley, 2013; Soldatic, 2015, 2013a; Soldatic and Grech, 2014). Rather than 
establishing a distinction between impairment and disability like the social model (Oliver, 
2009) or understanding ‘disability as a limitation or lack of competence on the part of the 
individual’ (Ariotti, 1999: 216), like the medical model, SDT considers both impairment and 
disability as significant to lived experience (Connell, 2011; Hollinsworth, 2013) and worthy 
of examination. As such, it theorises that race and impairment cannot be separated in 
practices of colonisation (Hollinsworth, 2013; Meekosha, 2011; Meekosha and Soldatic, 
2011; Soldatic, 2015), therefore placing an emphasis on recognising the role of colonisation 
and dispossession in the production of impairment (Connell, 2011; Hollinsworth, 2013; 
Meekosha, 2011) and acknowledging the role of the state and state violence in producing 
impairment rather than championing inclusion, equality and human rights. As Hollinsworth 
suggests ‘understanding Indigenous disability in Australia requires a critical examination of 
the history of racism that has systematically disabled most Indigenous people across 
generations and continues to cause disproportionate rates of impairment’ (2013:601). History 
also demonstrates the similarities between experiences of regulation for people with a 




disability and Indigenous Australians (Hollinsworth, 2013; Meekosha, 2011; Soldatic, 2015).  
  
Employing SDT is also useful for acknowledging the cultural construction of the term 
‘disability’ and how definitions of disability vary across Indigenous communities (Gilroy, 
2009; Hollinsworth, 2013; Meekosha, 2011; Soldatic, 2015). In some cases, disability was 
absent from language. Instead, impairments were attributed to individual organs rather than 
described through an overarching term which would segregate some members of society from 
others (Ariotti, 1999). Furthermore, ‘the category of disability for indigenous people within 
the white-settler colonial state resonates strongly with ongoing violence, oppression and 
stigmatization’ (Soldatic, 2015:57), which results in many Indigenous people not wanting to 
identify as a person with a disability or impairment because this categorises them as another 
marginalised identity which is also often controlled, managed and regulated in 
disempowering ways similar to categorisation based on skin colour and physical 
characteristics by the colonisers (Gilroy, 2009; Soldatic, 2015). In addition, Ariotti (1999) 
discusses how European settlement, institutions and professionals introduced the concept of 
disability into the Anangu and often it was through interaction with professionals and 
institutions that Indigenous children were identified as having an impairment. At times, this 
identification meant that the child was removed from the family for medical treatment or care 
with some children never returned. Acts such as these contribute to a reluctance to identify as 
a person with a disability (Gilroy, 2009). Hollinsworth also suggests that ‘poverty 
marginalization and racism can mean that many Indigenous Australians do not see 
impairment as a disability but as an aspect of more general challenges and disadvantage’ 
(2013: 601) which are attributable to colonisation. SDT provides a lens to capture the 
production of impairment through mechanisms of colonisation and dispossession and to 
understand different conceptualisations of disability. These alternative conceptualisations of 
disability are often obscured by the homogenising tendencies of disability theorising, which 
ignore the communities, lands and structures of power which have shaped the experiences of 
Indigenous people with a disability (Soldatic and Grech, 2014).  
  
 
Methodology: policy analysis  
 
We applied intersectionality and SDT as frameworks to analyse the targeting of Indigenous 
people with a PCW under CIM. Precisely because the intersection of indigeneity and 
disability is invisible in this policy context, we examined evidence that each category is 
targeted separately and then evidence of the intersection between categories. The point of our 
analysis, however, is not simply to reveal the cumulative effect of two categories of 
‘disadvantage’. Rather, we draw on SDT to expose the continuities with disabling and 
colonising technologies of population control that produced the intersection in the first place, 
and are likely to reinscribe it. 
  




Documents analysed, were official documents in the public domain including legislation, 
parliamentary debates, and civil society submissions to parliamentary inquiries selected 
through a purposive sampling technique. Since our research question concerned targeting, 
analysis of official policy documents was required. Documents were analysed when there 
was mention of the PCW category, and policy changes were made to the unemployment 
payment which were likely to impact upon people with a PCW. In addition, policy documents 
associated with income management were analysed when they automatically subscribed an 
income support recipient to income management based on the length of time spent on 
payment. This is known as the long-term welfare payment recipient CIM measure (part of the 
Vulnerable Welfare Payment Recipients measure), and is unlike other types of CIM where an 
individual is referred by an authority to be income managed. A decision was made to exclude 
types of income management requiring referral by an authority because of the role played by 
authorities in assessing one’s circumstances and determining whether a recipient should be 
subscribed to income management. The focus on people with a PCW and the automatic 
subscription to income management based on duration of payment, also underpinned the way 
in which the documents were searched. By applying intersectionality and SDT, it was 
possible to draw on the social and historical context of the policy documents, highlighting the 
historically contingent PCW category, and understand how Indigenous people with a PCW 
are constructed and governed as part of a wider process of population control (Spade, 2013). 
It also provided a framework to reveal and challenge regimes of truth in the policy 
documents, as well as disrupt the silences in the documents, including the failure to recognise 
the intersection of policy in governing the lives of Indigenous people with a PCW.  
 
Nonetheless, one of the ongoing limitations with intersectional policy analysis is a focus on 
oppression without attention to agency and resistance (Hankivsky, 2012). Our research 
engages with existing studies that examine the lived experience of Indigenous Australian’s 
subject to CIM (Bray et al., 2014) and that documents strategies of resistance (Bielefeld, 
2014; Marston et al., 2016). Further research could involve interviews with Indigenous 
people with a PCW and examine how the intersectional experience of indigeneity and 





Targeting at the intersection of social policy reforms 
 
By outlining recent social policy reforms, it can be established how changes to income 
support for people with a disability intersect with CIM to govern Indigenous people with a 
PCW. In 2006 the Australian Federal Howard Coalition government implemented the 
Employment and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other 
Measures) Act 2006 (Cth). This Act tightened the eligibility criteria for the DSP. People with 




a disability assessed as able to work 15 hours per week, were no longer eligible for the DSP 
and had to apply for an alternative payment such as NSA (Humpage, 2007). They became 
categorised in the income support system as people with a PCW, however, are often 
homogenised as NSA recipients. Since then, there have been further changes to the eligibility 
criteria for the DSP by various Federal governments, including subscribing DSP recipients to 
participation requirements and further increasing the number of people categorised as having 
a PCW (Mays, 2015). These changes to income support payments for people with disability 
have been actively supported and extended by both mainstream political parties in Australia 
(with only nuanced differences). Figures from September 2017 indicate that there are over 
172, 000 people in Australia on NSA classified with a PCW (Department of Social Services, 
2017). 
  
CIM was part of a packaged response (the Northern Territory Emergency Response) (NTER) 
by the Howard government to the Ampe Akelyernemane Meke Mekarle ‘Little Children are 
Sacred’ Report of the NT Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from 
Sexual Abuse (Wild and Anderson, 2007) and allegations of child sexual abuse in remote NT 
Indigenous communities. Following a declaration of a ‘national emergency’ by the Australian 
government in June 2007, the NTER legislated a number of measures, including the 
suspension of the RDA 1975 (Cth) which would separately govern Indigenous Australians in 
73 prescribed Indigenous communities in the NT. The measures included widespread alcohol 
restrictions, welfare reforms and compulsory health checks. The reforms also disestablished 
the Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) in prescribed areas. CDEP was a 
voluntary workfare scheme established in 1977 which ‘provides bulk grants to urban and 
remote Indigenous communities for community development, income support and 
employment creation’ (Stringer, 2007). Through this scheme, wages were provided to 
Indigenous people for their employment through Aboriginal organisations. They also received 
superannuation and protection through industrial mechanisms (McQuire, 2014). This was the 
largest employer of Indigenous people in the NT (McQuire, 2014). However, 
disestablishment occurred in favour of streamlining welfare payments, mainstreaming 
employment programs and job opportunities in the ‘real’ economy (Australian Government, 
2007). This was a contested response to the Report (Thill, 2009; Watson, 2011). Another 
measure introduced through the NTER was CIM, which managed the income support 
payments of Indigenous Australians residing in the prescribed communities in the NT 
(Humpage, 2016). CIM was not one of the recommendations of the Wild and Anderson 
(2007) Report.  
  
Following concerns raised with the indiscriminate application of CIM to Indigenous people 
(Watson, 2011), in 2010 the Rudd Labor Federal government revised CIM, introducing 
legislation to broaden it to both Indigenous and non-Indigenous welfare payment recipients. 
Despite theoretically extending CIM, in practice, the measures still predominantly target 
Indigenous welfare recipients (Bray, et al., 2012; Buckmaster, et al., 2012; Humpage, 2016). 




While there were various ways in which CIM was extended, this article will specifically 
focus on the long-term welfare payment recipient CIM measure. 
  
The long-term payment recipient measure targets ‘groups of people at high risk of social 
isolation and disengagement, poor financial literacy and participation in risky behaviours’ 
(Department of Social Services, 2015). The long-term payment recipient measure quarantines 
the income support payments of welfare recipients, aged 25 years to pension age in the NT 
receiving income support payments, including Youth Allowance, NSA, Special Benefit or 
Parenting Payment ‘for more than 12 of the last 24 months’ (Department of Human Services, 
2016). This includes people with a PCW. The income managed money is placed on a 
BasicsCard which is ‘a PIN protected card that allows [... access to income managed money] 
through EFTPOS facilities at approved stores and businesses’ (Department of Human 
Services, 2017a). In 2016, the Australian Government also trialled an extension of welfare 
quarantining wherein 80% of all welfare payments (excluding the age and veterans’ pensions) 
are subject to CIM and placed on the ‘Healthy Welfare (debt) Card’ (Humpage, 2016; 
Marston et al., 2016). The trial responded to a central recommendation of the Indigenous Jobs 
and Training Review (see Forrest, 2014) and was implemented in communities with high 
Indigenous populations (Marston et al., 2016). Although the Healthy Welfare Card trials 
support our argument that CIM continues to be racially targeted, the trial sites are outside of 
the NT and so an analysis of these changes is beyond the scope of this research.   
 
The capacity for the long-term payment recipient CIM measure to capture people with a 
PCW is unacknowledged in existing literature and policy discussions. This emphasises the 
importance of recognising how policy intersects to govern subjects and could be because 
‘[q]uite often we look at Newstart as one cohort; whereas, if you break it down, there are lots 
of cohorts’ (Australian Greens Senator Rachel Siewert cited in Commonwealth of Australia, 
Senate, October 24, 2012: 3). This has significant implications for Indigenous people with a 
PCW which will be explored shortly. 
 
 
Targeting people with a PCW 
 
Given that there is a lack of recognition of the intersection of policies governing Indigenous 
people with a PCW and, therefore, a shortage of data on the number of Indigenous people 
with a PCW who are subject to CIM, it is important to outline why Indigenous people with 
PCW are more likely to be captured by the criterion categorising long-term payment 
recipients. A person is placed on the long-term payment recipient measure once they have 
been identified by Centrelink (the agency responsible for the distribution of Australian social 
security payments) as close to meeting the criteria because of their duration on payment. The 
individual is contacted via postal letter informing them that they will be subject to CIM. The 
letter requests that they ‘attend an interview with Centrelink to discuss their income 




management arrangements’ (Bray, et al., 2014:23). As the subscription of Indigenous people 
with a PCW to CIM remains unexamined, this exploration occurs through examining why 
people with a PCW and Indigenous people are likely to meet the criteria separately. This is 
not to suggest that the identity categories themselves do not intersect in the lived experiences 
of recipients, but rather to provide further evidence of the need for an intersectional approach 
in this context. 
  
The criteria is likely to automatically and disproportionately capture people with a PCW 
because it does not consider the disadvantaged social and economic position of PCW which 
could impact on their duration on payment. Additionally, the criterion ignores the average 
length and median duration of payment for people with a PCW and the ableist notions 
underpinning the time-based subscription criteria to income management.  
  
The unemployment rate for people with a disability in Australia is 10%, which is nearly 
double the rate for people without a disability (5.3%) (ABS, 2016a). Furthermore, Australia’s 
employment rate for people with a disability is low at 53.4% (ABS, 2016a) compared with an 
OECD average of 60% or 70% for the top eight OECD countries (PwC, 2011). People with a 
disability are also more likely to be engaged in part-time employment and experience higher 
rates of underemployment (ABS, 2012). The barriers to accessing and participating in 
employment for people with a disability are well documented (Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2016; Humpage, 2007; National People with Disabilities and Carer Council, 
2009; Soldatic and Chapman, 2010). Social barriers to employment include employer 
attitudes, education experience, inaccessible public transport, insufficient transport 
infrastructure, inaccessible buildings, discrimination and the cost of participating in the 
labour market for people with a disability (Galvin, 2004; Humpage, 2007). If these social 
barriers to employment participation are not addressed for people with a PCW, their position 
is likely to be reproduced, perpetuating the conditions which lead to the subscription of 
people with a PCW to CIM. 
 
In addition, because the long-term payment recipient criterion does not consider the average 
length and median duration on payment for people with a PCW and the overrepresentation of 
people with a disability considered to be long-term unemployed (Fowkes, 2011), it is 
anticipated that people with a PCW would be subscribed to CIM. People with a PCW receive 
welfare payments for an average of five years as opposed to approximately three and a half 
years for the general NSA population (DEEWR et al., 2012). The ‘median duration for 
Newstart Allowance recipients with a partial capacity to work [on payment was]…151 weeks 
compared to 88 weeks for the general Newstart Allowance population’ (DEEWR et al., 2012: 
81). While the long-term payment recipient criteria could then capture both groups of NSA 
recipients, the prolonged duration on payment for people with a PCW, means that it is more 
likely that people with a PCW would be automatically income managed. The long-term 
payment recipient CIM trigger, then acts as a disciplining technique to encourage 




employment and punish those who do not comply. This time trigger perpetuates an able-
bodied norm and, similar to Soldatic’s (2013b) argument about ‘the Appointment’ with 
regards to the original changes to the DSP, the time trigger for income management does not 
consider the lived experience of people with a disability.
1
 The CIM trigger for long-term 
payment recipients in the NT who have been in receivership of NSA for 52 of the previous 
104 weeks, is a deadline which requires people with a disability, particularly those with 
episodic conditions, to synchronize their bodily patterns to gain employment within a system 
which contains many barriers to their participation despite a willingness to work (Australian 
Human Rights Commission, 2016). This suggests that people are able ‘to control and 
synchronize the competing set of temporalities managed in everyday life’ (Soldatic, 
2013b:411). It also suggests that a failure to do so is a problem of the individual who has 
deliberately chosen to remain on income support. In addition, the effects of placing a time 
limit on PCW, such as increased anxiety and unrealistic expectations based on social and 
impairment barriers such as pain, are ignored. This neutral policy then overlooks the cost and 
labour involved in attempting to perform in accordance with an able-bodied norm for people 
with a disability.   
  
 
Targeting Indigenous Australians  
 
Alongside explaining the reasons why it is likely that people with a PCW will be captured by 
the long-term payment recipient CIM measure, it is also important to establish why 
Indigenous Australians are captured. Particularly, and given that statistics suggest that despite 
the extension of CIM to Indigenous and non-Indigenous welfare recipients in the NT, 
Indigenous Australians were more likely to have their incomes managed. For example, as at 
August 31, 2016 87% of those subscribed to the long-term recipient measure in the NT, were 
Indigenous (Australian Government, 2016). Much like people with a disability, the 
disadvantaged position of Indigenous Australians who are impacted by historical policies and 
have difficulty accessing the labour market is ignored. Furthermore, the design of 
mechanisms in the income support system, perpetuate conditions which could facilitate 
income management.  
  
The long-term payment recipient measure, ignores the structurally disadvantaged position of 
Indigenous Australians (Dawson, 2011/2012; Mendes, 2013) produced through colonisation 
and dispossession. This is similar to the problem identified by disability studies scholars 
earlier where the ‘problem’ of unemployment is individualised to people with a disability, 
without considering or addressing the social barriers which impede their economic 
participation. Bielefeld (2012) emphasises how the government appears to blame Indigenous 
Australians for their position on income support, obscuring the colonial context which has 
produced conditions of poverty for Indigenous Australians. By doing this, it justifies the 
paternalistic regulation of Indigenous Australians through measures which seek to ‘normalise’ 




their conduct such as, CIM. It also ‘resonates with the same fundamentally erroneous 
assumptions that characterised many years of colonial legislation preceding it, namely, that 
there was truth in the Darwinian logic that Indigenous peoples are too child-like and simple-
minded to deal with something as complicated as participation in the cash economy’ 
(Bielefeld, 2012: 535) and require conditions on the receivership of their payments to 
promote compliance with the values of whiteness and develop skills in self-government. If 
Australia’s CIM laws do not allow for reparation or justice for Indigenous Australians 
affected by historical policies, and instead promotes a continuation of the ‘same colonial 
assumptions about Indigenous people’s financial capacity’ (Bielefeld, 2012:528), then it is 
unlikely that the reforms will succeed- ‘substantive injustice will occur, and… reparation will 
not’ (Bielefeld, 2012:528). This is because, as Bielefeld (2012) suggests, the measures 
undermine the autonomy and dignity of Indigenous Australians rather than promote skills in 
self-government. 
  
Similar to people with a disability, Indigenous Australians experience barriers to their 
employment participation. According to the 2014-15 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Social Survey (NATISS), these populations have ‘a labour participation rate of 58%’ 
(cited in ABS, 2016b) with the lowest labour force participation rate in the NT at 47%. They 
are significantly less likely to be employed than non-Indigenous Australians (ABS, 2016b). 
For example in 2012, 64.5% of Indigenous Australians were participating in comparison to 
78.6% of non-Indigenous Australians (ABS, 2017). In addition, like the systematic exclusion 
of people with a disability from the labour market, Indigenous Australians have also been 
excluded and discriminated against. Indigenous Australians experience discrimination in 
employment including, difficulty securing employment and underpayment (Australian 
Human Rights Commission, 2015) making it difficult for them to participate in the market 
economy (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2015; Bielefeld, 2012). Biddle et al. (2013) 
describe how in some cases, experiencing discrimination in employment leads Indigenous 
Australians to withdraw from participating in the labour market.  
  
The CIM exemption criteria is also problematic for Indigenous Australians subscribed to CIM 
(Bielefeld, 2012; Bielefeld and Altman, 2015; Humpage, 2016). The exemption criteria for 
the long-term payment recipient measure places the ‘burden of proof…on those [income 
managed] recipients to demonstrate that they are socially responsible’ (Buckmaster et al., 
2010:17) and do not need to be income managed. Though the criterion differs dependent on 
whether recipients have dependent children, social responsibility is evidenced through 
engaging in employment, enrolment in study and responsible parenting (Buckmaster et al., 
2010). This criterion may be difficult for Indigenous Australians in remote communities to 
meet, because ‘there are limited opportunities for study or part-time work in many Aboriginal 
communities, so the prospect of exemption based on learning or earning is illusory’ (Billings 
and Cassimatis, 2009:68). 
  




In addition, Bielefeld (2012) indicates that there is discrimination and paternalism operating 
in the application of the exemption criteria, using evidence of the significant number of non-
Indigenous recipients granted an exemption, in comparison to Indigenous recipients who are 
income managed. Bray et al. (2014 cited in Humpage, 2016:560-561) found: 
  
...both lower rates of application and higher rejection rates for exemptions among 
Indigenous peoples, resulting in their on average spending 97.1 out of 124.5 weeks on 
income support under CIM compared to 34 out of 54.7 weeks receiving income 
support amongst non-Indigenous people  
  
Several problems have been raised with the exemption criteria, including language barriers 
and a lack of knowledge about and difficulties with applying for an exemption (Bielefeld, 
2012; Billings and Cassimatis, 2009). This provides evidence for why Indigenous Australians 
are likely to be captured by the long-term payment recipient measures. The exemption criteria 
should be practically plausible for Indigenous Australians and not just a theoretical possibility 
(Bielefeld, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, the situation of those Indigenous welfare recipients in remote communities is 
complicated with regard to employment and income support. Successive governments have 
been criticised for their lack of investment in employment and education in remote 
Indigenous communities and their lack of engagement with community-led initiatives 
(Central Land Council, 2017). In addition, the existence of various ‘work-for-the-dole’ 
schemes in remote communities has impacted on Indigenous welfare recipients. Though the 
Howard government dismantled CDEP through the NTER, and in the process increasing 
unemployment rates dramatically (Altman cited in McQuire, 2014), the Rudd government 
reintroduced a watered-down version. This was transitioned into the Remote Jobs and 
Community Program (RJCP) in 2013 which was superseded by the Community Development 
Programme (CDP) in 2015. These programs have seen Indigenous peoples working long 
hours for NSA payments. For example, ‘Under the…RJCP, Aboriginal workers in NT 
communities were already working 16 hours a week for Newstart wages’ (McQuire, 2014). 
CDP toughened ‘requirements forcing welfare recipients in remote areas to work 25 hours, 
five days a week over 52 weeks in order to receive their welfare payments’ (McQuire, 2014). 
According to Fowkes (2017):  
 
All people on income support who have ‘participation requirements’ and live in CDP 
regions must participate in the … program as a condition of receiving income support. 
Most participants are on Newstart (72%)....84% of […participants] are identified as 
Indigenous [and] unemployed people with disabilities are also included in this program.  
 
There is no superannuation paid or industrial protections in place (Gibson, 2017). Payments 
are docked if obligations are not kept, and Centrelink payments can be stopped for eight 




weeks. Furthermore, despite participating in such a program, the payments of NT CDP 
participants can be income managed (Gibson, 2017; Klein, 2017). Programs such as this 
which seek ‘to deliver better opportunities for remote job-seekers and foster stronger 
economic and social outcomes in remote Australia’ (Department of Jobs and Small Business, 
2018), contribute to the problematic conditions of income support receivership. 
  
Through an examination of why people with a PCW and Indigenous Australians are likely to 
be captured by the long-term payment recipient criteria, it is clear that without an 
acknowledgement of intersectionality, across identity and policy, Indigenous people with a 
PCW are more susceptible to CIM, particularly given the similarities across employment 
participation rates and barriers to employment. This failure to recognise the intersection of 
policy in governing the lives of Indigenous people with a PCW subscribes them to policies 
which regulate them through a white, able-bodied norm. 
  
 
Continuities of population control 
 
Since both Indigenous people and people with a PCW are disproportionately targeted by 
CIM, then it follows that Indigenous people with a PCW are disproportionately targeted by 
CIM. Disability is prevalent in Indigenous communities, with Indigenous people twice as 
likely as non-Indigenous Australians to be living with impairment (Hollinsworth, 2013; 
Soldatic, 2015). Nonetheless, our point is not simply to claim that indigeneity and disability 
combine to produce a ‘double disadvantage’ (Gething cited in Hollinsworth, 2013:602). 
Rather, by using an intersectional framework to examine subjection to CIM, we have traced 
how supposedly neutral policy measures target marginalised subpopulations of long-term 
unemployed people– Indigenous people, people with a disability and, by extension, 
Indigenous people with a disability– without considering their oppressed position. For 
example, in 2012, ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people with a disability were 
significantly less likely than non-Indigenous people with a disability to be employed (25.6% 
compared with 48.7%)’ and ‘[t]he unemployment rate for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people with a disability was nearly three times as high as the comparable rate for 
non-Indigenous people with a disability’ (ABS, 2017). While CIM as a technology of 
population control has been labelled ‘unprecedented’ (Mendes, 2013:503), in this final 
section, we draw on Southern disability studies to expose the continuities with disabling and 
colonising technologies of population control. 
  
Mendes (2013:503) suggests that CIM represents a significant shift in Australia’s welfare 
system, transferring welfare from a mechanism of poverty alleviation to one of control. He 
describes how: 
  
CIM [which includes the long-term payment measure] seems to take … [the] shift to 




conditional welfare even further by imposing an unprecedented restriction of individual 
freedom in an attempt to promote behavioural change. Centrelink is arguably being 
given judicial powers similar to those granted to Guardianship authorities in cases 
where people assessed to have significant disabilities are unable to manage their 
personal or financial affairs (emphasis added). 
  
Mendes’ (2013) analogy between guardianship authorities and CIM is contradictory, 
however, since it demonstrates the opposite point, that the subscription of people with a 
psychological disability to government measures which manage income is not 
‘unprecedented’. Likewise, numerous scholars trace the continuity between CIM and 
historical mechanisms of colonial control such as rationing (see Bielefeld, 2014/2015; 
Gibson, 2012; Humpage, 2016; Watson, 2011). Rationing is associated with ‘‘assimilation’ as 
a formal policy framework…when Aboriginal people were not entitled to handle cash like 
other citizens and rationing regimes were used to control Aboriginal movement and labour, as 
well as to try and discipline people out of ‘Aboriginal’ behaviours’ (Gibson, 2012:63). In this 
context, Indigenous workers were denied all or part of their wages and required to petition 
Aboriginal ‘protectors’ to access and use their own income (Watson, 2011).  
  
While there are similarities between these practices of population control, they do not simply 
operate separately, but also intersect. For example, the racialising discourse of indigenous 
inferiority that underpinned rationing is ‘disabling for all Indigenous Australians regardless of 
impairment’ (Hollinsworth, 2013:602). Furthermore, the dehumanising process of subjection 
to colonial domination and the widespread poverty produced by practices such as rationing, 
has generated significantly disproportionate impairment rates among Indigenous Australians 
(Hollinsworth, 2013; Meekosha, 2011). These rates are disproportionate not only in 
comparison to non-Indigenous Australians, but also to first peoples of other settler colonial 
nations such as Canada, the US and New Zealand where treaties exist between indigenous 
and non-indigenous people (Soldatic, 2015). 
  
We argue that the continuity between CIM and colonial practices of population control 
renders CIM similarly disabling. CIM not only reproduces the historical representation of 
Indigenous people as ‘primitive, childlike and thus incapable of dealing with financial 
matters [but] also [adds] the inability to stay sober, resist drugs and demonstrate a work ethic 
to the list of cultural deficits found in Aboriginal communities’ (Humpage, 2016:567). As 
Hollinsworth (2013) suggests, this type of negative stereotyping is disabling for all 
Indigenous Australians. Moreover, evaluations of CIM have found that the stigma associated 
with using the BasicsCard has produced shame, humiliation, disempowerment and 
experiences of psychological impairment including anxiety and depression (Humpage, 2016; 
Mendes, 2013; Watson, 2011). The Australian Indigenous Doctors Association maintains that 
the NTER (including CIM) has produced a sense of “collective existential 
despair”...characterised by a widespread sense of helplessness, hopelessness, and 




worthlessness, and experienced throughout entire community(s)’ (cited in Watson, 2011: 
151). This claim resonates with Meekosha’s (2011) use of the concept of social suffering to 
capture the lived experience of Indigenous Australians disabled by conditions of colonisation. 
Importantly, her point is not to reproduce dominant representations of disability as a personal 
tragedy, but rather to recognise the collective injustice of colonisation and the complex 
intersection between indigeneity and disability in this context. 
  
 
Conclusion: intersectional solidarity 
 
In this article, we applied intersectionality and SDT to analyse the subjection of Indigenous 
people with a PCW to CIM. Although the program is ability-neutral and now formally 
complies with the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, we found substantive evidence that it 
targets Indigenous people with a PCW. This is because it fails to address the social and 
cultural barriers experienced by Indigenous people with a disability, and reinscribes disabling 
and colonising technologies of population control, which produce impairment. By way of 
conclusion, we reflect on the significance of intersectionality and SDT as frameworks for 
policy analysis and advocacy.  
 
One of the key contributions of applying an intersectional and SDT framework to policy 
analysis is to expose how policies such as CIM, target and stigmatise– in this case, 
Indigenous people with a PCW. This process does not contribute to solving the problems of 
Indigenous people with a disability, but instead constitutes a mechanism of population control 
that reproduces social suffering and produces impairment. While the government has justified 
CIM on the basis of protecting Aboriginal women and children from violence and abuse, 
contributing to community wellbeing and promoting self-reliance (Humpage, 2016; Watson, 
2011), a decade after its implementation, the evidence-base for these claims remains limited 
(Marston et al., 2016). It is contradictory to suggest that paternalistic mechanisms of 
population control can promote self-reliance. Instead, they are likely to exacerbate the 
problem of welfare dependency and undermine Indigenous claims for self-determination 
(Humpage, 2016). 
  
Another contribution of this approach is to demonstrate the importance of ‘building solidarity 
between indigenous people and the disability movement’ (Soldatic, 2015:64) as a basis for 
resisting disabling and colonising technologies of population control reproduced in 
contemporary social policy reforms. From an intersectionality and SDT perspective, however, 
fostering a basis for solidarity is a complex task. UN human rights instruments have been 
used to argue for the reinstatement of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 in the context of the 
NTER (Anaya, 2010) and as a tool for national advocacy of the intersectional rights of people 
with a disability (Kayess et al., 2014). Nonetheless, although this suggests that human rights 
might offer a shared basis for solidarity, the use of human rights instruments for rights-based 




advocacy at the national level, also problematically reinforces the sovereignty of the nation-
state, obscures recognition of Indigenous sovereignty, and undercuts Indigenous practices of 
decolonisation (Soldatic, 2015). 
 
Marston et al. (2016) suggest self-determination as a shared principle that could unite 
Indigenous people and the disability movement. They make clear, however, that mobilising 
popular support for self-determination would require reframing the argument that 
‘governments have a right to determine how [‘taxpayer money’] is spent’ (Marston et al., 
2016:410). Arguments for the recognition of shared vulnerability and complicity in social 
relations of power and privilege can usefully contribute to this reframing (Marston et al., 
2016) and contribute to a broader basis for solidarity. Such arguments articulate with the 
claims of SDT that vulnerability to impairment is shaped by colonial relations (Meekosha, 
2011). They also align with intersectional disability justice activism seeking to transform the 
stigmatisation of dependency with recognition of shared interdependence (Spade, 2013) as 







 The changes made by the Howard government to the DSP through the Employment and 
Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other Measures) Act 
2006 meant that those people with a disability who were previously eligible for the DSP 
would no longer be eligible if they were assessed as capable of working between 15-29 hours 
per week. Instead, they became eligible for NSA. As part of maintaining access to NSA, 
people with a PCW may be required to report any weekly earnings, attend regular interviews 
and appointments and job search. Should a recipient fail to meet the obligations required for 
payment, such as failing to attend an interview or appointment, they are seen as having 
committed a participation failure, breaching their responsibilities with the government and 
could lose their payment. Soldatic (2013: 407) discusses the Appointment as a disciplining 
mechanism which ‘frames and reframes individual biographies and the experience of 
everyday life, determining access to a range of social supports and service’. She 
problematises the Appointment which although ‘appear[…s] as a neutral, rational, calculable 
action’ (415) may ignore those bodies which are unable to synchronize with the Appointment 
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1
 The changes made by  the Howard government to the DSP through the Employment and W orkplace Relat ions Legis lation Amendment (Welfa re to Work and Other Measures) Act 2006  meant that those peop le with a d isabil ity  who were previously  eligib le for the DSP woul d no longer be eligib le if they  were assessed as capable of working  between 15-29 hours  per week. Instead, they  became eligible for NSA. As part of maintain ing access to N SA, peop le with a PCW may  be required to report any  weekly  earnings, attend regular interviews and appoin tments and job search. Should a recipient fail to meet the obligations required for payment, such as failing to at tend an in terview or appointment, they  are seen as having committed a participation failure, breaching their responsib ili ties with the government and could lo se their payment. Soldatic (2013) d iscusses the Appointment as a discip lin ing mechanism which ‘frames and reframes individual biographies and the experience of everyday  life, determining access to a range of social supports and service’ (Soldatic, 2013 : 407). She prob lematises the Appointment 
which although ‘appear[…s] as a neutral, rational, calculable action ’ (So ldatic, 2013: 415) may  ignore those bodies which are  unable to synchronize with  the Appo intment time, thus becoming ‘a social relation of power’ ( Soldatic, 2013: 415).  
 
